The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

Extending and expanding Geiger and Feller’s analysis of increasing dispersion in R&D expenditures during the 1980s, the paper analyzes publication and citation counts as well as R&D expenditures for 194 top producers using Web of Science data. We find high and stable levels of inequality in the 1990s and 2000s, combined with robust growth both in the system and on individual campuses, considerable opportunities for short-range mobility and very limited opportunities for long-range mobility. Initial investments in research, private control, and (...) the capacity of wealthy institutions to attract productive faculty are associated with high levels of scientific output. New entrants to the system and those that leave the system are both clustered near the bottom of the hierarchy. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

We studied how people determine when they are in control of objects. In a computer task, participants moved a virtual boat towards a goal using a joystick to investigate how subjective control is shaped by (1) correspondence between motor actions and the visual consequences of those actions, and (2) attainment of higher-level goals. In Experiment 1, random discrepancies from joystick input (noise) decreased judgments of control (JoCs), but discrepancies that brought the boat closer to the goal and increased success (the (...) autopilot) increased JoCs. In Experiment 2, participants raced to the goal against a computer-controlled rival boat while varying levels of noise interfered with each boat. Participants reached the goal more often and rated their own control higher when the computer rival had good control. Subjective control over moving objects depends partly on consistency between motor actions and their effects, but is also modulated by perceived success and competition. -/- Keywords: Control; Action; Feedback; Competition . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Side Stepping The Issues: Disappointment With An Ethics Consult For A Medically High Risk PatientBrent R. CarrMonths of severe symptoms were a blur—hour after hour of suffering. Sleep is her only respite. Her 5-word diagnosis, “treatment-refractory depression with anxious distress,” seemed too orderly, like a flattened 2-dimensional strip of ribbon that simply ironed out all the chaos and confused distress roiling within her. Anyone entering the psychiatric unit early (...) in the morning could hear her near-breathless sobbing, calling for nursing help, repeatedly pleading to anyone who would listen that she was dying. By afternoon, her wheelchair would be situated off to one side of the milieu to prevent agitation of other [End Page 13] patients. From there, she would summon them with small gestures or brief, incessant outbursts to save her, that her body was decaying, withering before them. Such is the torment of nihilistic delusions. She flailed her arms, rocking back and forth, lamenting that no one would help. Although she possessed full leg strength, she refused to stand from the wheelchair, fearing collapse. These distressed pleas were sustained well past each dinner, the anguish echoing from her room, and during her evening shower. Sometimes a pillow-muffled sigh and silence would disclose when her torments became engulfed in sleep.Two years prior, she had a similar episode that lasted almost 3-years. It had failed to respond to months of psychotherapy and more than 15 medication trials. That time, she had cried with happiness after the mental illness went into full remission after only a three-week course of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). She described this as her miracle. But as miraculous as the ECT was for her, it was problematic. She is a high-risk patient with ongoing hypertension and Wolff-Parkinson-White Syndrome, a condition that leads to an inappropriately fast pulse from aberrant electrical pathways in the heart. During the final week of ECT, she experienced a marked blood pressure surge that led to severe cardiac pathology—Takatsubo’s cardiomyopathy. This is also known as “stress cardiomyopathy” or “broken heart syndrome,” befitting the vexed emotional state she had been in. The cardiomyopathy resembled a myocardial infarct, and it took several months for her to fully recover. Unfortunately, this prevented the use of ECT as a relapse prevention treatment. By one-year post-ECT, her systolic left ventricular dysfunction had resolved, and her ejection fraction (the heart’s pumping efficiency) had normalized.Now, once again, she was treatment-resistant, and ECT was the treatment of choice. The risk stratification for ECT encompassed her prior Takatsubo’s cardiomyopathy, which has a small but known chance for recurrence. This made her a high-risk patient. This risk was convoluted even more by her depression-induced psychosis, wherein she believed that she was dying, that meds were poisoning her, and that ECT would kill her from a heart attack. Before the psychiatric team consulted the ECT service, a mental health court had already ruled regarding her lack of capacity for her medical decisions. The court had authorized her husband as her proxy with authority to consent for her medical care, including for ECT. My role in this case was as the ECT proceduralist from the neuromodulation service who had been consulted by the primary team. The husband was an informed individual and signed consent for ECT. These events all coincided with the primary attending’s departure on scheduled leave. There was now a new covering attending.The resident psychiatrist was apprehensive about ECT and deliberated that the patient was at least able to identify potential risks of ECT—even if exacerbated by a nihilistic delusion. The resident speculated that perhaps the patient should at least be able to refuse ECT, given her previous cardiomyopathy. The newly arrived attending deferred a response regarding her concern and stated it had already been decided by the “team.” This amplified doubt. The medical students sensed the resident’s apprehension and felt confused about whether the patient should receive ECT or not. This dynamic quickly spilled over into nursing discussions, where some were now hesitating about the decision. The cohesiveness of the psychiatry treatment team was compromised... (shrink)

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

This study represents an improvement in the ethics scales inventory published in a 1988 Journal of Business Ethics article. The article presents the distillation and validation process whereby the original 33 item inventory was reduced to eight items. These eight items comprise the following ethical dimensions: a moral equity dimension, a relativism dimension, and a contractualism dimension. The multidimensional ethics scale demonstrates significant predictive ability.

Actions that financially benefit one person may present risk to another person. For example, the payment incentives of portfolio managers and investors are often asymmetrical such that actions that benefit a portfolio manager can pose financial risk to clients. Despite the presence and potential harm of these asymmetries, few have addressed the question of who exploits these asymmetries and how to mitigate potential harm. Our study examined the effect of selfish personality traits (the Dark Triad) and interpersonal bonding on decision-making (...) for the self, another person, and another person with under reward asymmetry present. Results demonstrated that individuals higher in narcissism and psychopathy made risky decisions for themselves. However, when reward asymmetries were present, all three Dark Triad traits were associated with making riskier decisions for another person in order to benefit the self. There was also a significant interaction between interpersonal closeness generated through bonding and psychopathy such that bonding made the decision-making processes of those high in psychopathy less risky for others. These findings have implications for how different individuals with different relationships make self and other-based financial decisions, and how those decisions change when rewards are asymmetrical. (shrink)

Drosophila neural progenitor cells, or neuroblasts, alter their transcriptional profile over time to produce different neural cell types. A recent paper by Pearson and Doe shows that older neuroblasts can be reprogrammed to behave like young neuroblasts, and to produce early neural cell types, simply by expressing the transcription factor, Hunchback.1 The authors show that competence to respond to Hunchback diminishes over time. Mani pulating neural progenitors in this way may have important implications for therapeutic uses of neural stem cells. (...) BioEssays 26:711–714, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)